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BROWN v IOWA LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL: STRUGGLING WITH THE
APPLICATION OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT TO COMPUTERIZED
GOVERNMENT RECORDS
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act 1 (FOIA) in 1966 in
order to promote a policy of open government and to expand the public's
access to government-held information. 2 The FOIA compels government
agencies to disclose, upon request, any records not encompassed by one
of nine specific exemptions. 3 Although the FOIA applies only to federal
records, all fifty states have also adopted statutes providing public access
4
to state government-held records.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
2. See Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerizationof Government Information: Does it Circumvent Public Access Under the Freedom of InformationAct and the Depository Library

Program?,24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 267 (1990); Stephen F. Hehl, Reverse FOJA Suits
After Chrysler:A New Direction, 48 FoRDHAM L. REV. 185 (1979); Jamie Grodsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is Not User Friendly, 31
JuRimETRIcs J. 17 (1990); Eric M. Freedman, Freedom of Informationand the FirstAmendment in a BureaucraticAge, 49 BROOK L. REv. 835 (1983).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988). For the full text of the nine exemptions, see infra
note 68.
4. See generallyALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 et seq. (1990);
ARmz REV. STAT. ANN. §39-121 et seq. (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (1990); CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 6250 et seq. (1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-201 et seq. (1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-17 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 et seq. (1988); GA. CODE ANN.

§ 50-18-70 et seq. (Harrison 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-1 et seq. (1989); IDAHO CODE § 9338 et seq. (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116 para. 43.4 et seq. (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-143-1 et seq. (West 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 22.1 et seq. (West 1990); KA. STAT. ANN. § 45215 et seq. (1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.870 et seq. (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:1 et seq. (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 et seq. (West
1989); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-613 et seq. (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66,
§ 1 et seq. (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.231 et seq. (West 1990); MINN. STAT.

ANN § 13.03 et seq. (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010 et seq. (Vernon 1990); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 2-6-101 et seq. (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.01 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 239.010 et seq. (Michie 1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1 et seq. (1989); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 et seq. (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (Michie 1990); N.Y.
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Like the federal FOIA, the individual state "freedom of information,"
"public records," or "sunshine" acts5 require that government bodies provide the public with access to information about deliberative processes as
well as a wide range of documents and records on file with government
agencies. 6 The increasingly widespread use of electronic information
technology, however, is proving to be problematic with respect to the dissemination of information under these statutes. 7 Although the FOIA refers to government "records," because it was drafted in the 1960's, there
is no indication of what a "record" could consist of in the computer age.
Consequently, courts and government agencies have been struggling
with the application of the FOIA to computerized government records.
This has resulted in ambiguous, and often restrictive decisions regarding
requests for information.
Within the range of information to which the public has access is
information relating to legislative redistricting of the states.8 The U.S.
Constitution requires the legislature of each state to redistrict the state
for voting purposes every ten years, immediately subsequent to the
United States decennial census. 9 Redistricting is a process that affects
thousands of state and local governments.' 0 In order to redistrict, the
legislature must obtain census data and organize it into workable categories, from which the legislature then proposes appropriate voting disPUB. OFF. LAw § 84 et seq. (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 et seq. (1989); N.D.

CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1989); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Anderson 1990); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.1 et seq. (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.410 et seq. (1990); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1 et seq. (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 et seq. (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 30-4-30 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-27-1 et seq. (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-301 et seq. (1990); TEx. GovT. CODE ANN. §552.225 (West 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. §63-2-201 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §315 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1340 et seq. (Michie 1990); WASH. RV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.250 et seq. (West 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 29B-1-1 et seq. (1990); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 19.31 et seq. (West 1986); Wyo. STAT.
§ 16-4-201 et seq. (1990).
5. Kimball Brace, Doug Chapin & Wayne Arden, Whose Data is it Anyway?: Conflicts
Between Freedom of Information and Trade Secret Protection in Legislative Redistricting,
21 STETsoN L. REv. 723, 727 (1992).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
7. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 18. ... FOIA's continued ability to fulfill its mission
is threatened." Id.
8. See Brace, supra note 5, at 727 (explaining why public access to redistricting information is considered to be a right.) Because tax dollars are spent in compiling redistricting
information and because of the political implications of the redistricting process, there are
many who feel that access to this information is the public's undeniable right. Id. In suits
under the FOIA, parties seeking access to information often cite fairness and the threat of
unrepresentative government as reasons for disclosure of such information. Id. at 728.
9. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
10. See Brace, supra note 5, at 726 (for a discussion of the process and its purpose.)

19941

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

tricts to the public. 1 ' Because this practice directly affects the voting
process, which is an area of significant public concern, information regarding redistricting is matter clearly encompassed by public records
2
laws.1
Nonetheless, private companies (referred to as vendors), hired by
government bodies to organize the data used in the redistricting and
myriad other processes, are challenging this apparently fundamental
right to that information.' 3 These challenges prove to be successful in
many instances simply because the components of computerized information are blurred and, frequently, neither the litigants, the attorneys,
nor the judges deciding these cases have the technological literacy to
14
fully and accurately separate the issues.
In Brown v. Iowa Legislative Council,15 the Iowa Supreme Court denied Ralph R. Brown (Brown), a private citizen, access to legislative redistricting data. A private vendor prepared the redistricting information
for the legislative council using its own computer program.' 6 The issue
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state legislative districts be "as nearly of equal population as is practicable.") See also Brace, supra note 5, at 727 (explaining how this simply worded
requirement belies the complex nature of the process of assembling data and converting it
for use in redistricting.) This process, called "database development" consists of compiling
data in different forms from different sources, keeping abreast of redistricting law and policy, and finally converting data for practical use in redistricting. Id.
12. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, para. 201 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-1
(Burns 1987) (emphasizing how public access to government information is tied to a democratic theory.) The statutes recognize that the right of access to government information is
essential in order to enable the public to fulfill its duties of discussing public issues and
making informed political decisions.
13. See Daniel Gorham Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of InformationAct Law.
suit, 55 TEx. L. REV. 587 (1977) (discussing reverse Freedom of Information Act suits as a
vast area of litigation.) In reverse FOIA suits, parties who have provided information to
government agencies file suits attempting to enjoin those government agencies from disclosing their allegedly confidential or proprietary information. Id. at 589. Reverse FOIA
lawsuits raise several important issues about how agencies should handle business information submitted by private parties or businesses. Id. at 590. These issues include "the
extent to which submitters have a right to compel agencies to maintain the confidentiality
of this information and the sources of law available to submitters seeking to enjoin agencies from disclosing this information pursuant to FOIA requests; the limits of agency authority under the FOIA and other related information statutes and regulations to release
this information; the role that submitters are legally entitled to play before agencies or
courts considering FOIA disclosure requests; and, whether courts or agencies are better
equipped to handle the growing burden of adjudicating these cases." Id.
14. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 27.
15. Brown v. Iowa Legislative Council, 490 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1992).
16. See Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal, Bill F. Chamberlin and Linda M.
Perry, Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FL. ST. U. L. Rav. 543, 569 (1993) (defining "computer
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the court decided was whether the computer data, as developed by the
vendor, was a trade secret 17 and, therefore, exempt from disclosure
under Iowa's public records law.' 8 The court concluded that the
processed data, and the software that made it accessible, constituted a
trade secret and would not order disclosure of the redistricting
information. 19
The decision in Brown is important because it extends beyond requests for access to redistricting information; it affects access to all public records held in computer data bases. 20 Approximately one-third of
state public records laws contain exemptions for trade secrets. 2 1 To interpret a statutory exemption (e.g., a trade secret exemption) as an absolute bar to the release of certain information "would be at war with the
basic principles embodied in the FOIA."2 2 Most, if not all, government
records will eventually be stored in computer databases. 2 3 If government bodies continue on this course, keeping government information
from the public simply because vendors want to protect the programs
program" as a set of digital instructions that tells a computer how to sort and organize
data.)
17. Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 246 (Iowa 1988) (explaining that "[w]hile an exact definition of trade secret does not exist, certain factors may indicate whether information is a trade secret.") These factors include: "(1) the extent to which
the information is known outside of the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken . . . to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the business and its
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended.., in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others." Id.
18. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7(3) (West 1991). The trade secret exemption reads "[tihe
following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by
the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized to release such
information: ... (3) [tirade secrets which are recognized and protected as such by law." Id.
19. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
20. Bunker, supra note 16, at 566 (explaining that the breadth of information accessible under the FOIA and its state equivalents is limited only by the specific exemptions and/
or court decisions.) Courts should not allow agencies to deny the public access to data
merely because the agencies utilize computers in organizing the data. Id.
21. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes 'Trade Secrets" Exempt from Disclosure Under State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R.4th 773, 774 (1989).
22. Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1976).
23. See Bunker, supra note 16, at 559 (noting that in approximately the last ten years,
the use of computers in government operations has increased substantially.) Considering
the convenience and cost savings enjoyed by the government agencies using computers, the
trend toward computerization of records and functions will undoubtedly continue. Id. The
number or large computers, known as mainframes, used by federal agencies escalated from
about 22,000 in 1986 to almost 48,000 in 1990. Id. The use of microcomputers, or personal
computers, in federal agencies grew from about 490,000 in 1987 to more than one million in
1989. Id. (citing General Servs. Admin., Federal Equipment Data Center, Automatic Data
ProcessingEquipment in the U.S. Government (Apr. 1990.))
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they have written to organize that data, they will succeed in severely
hindering the implementation and goals of the FOIA. 24 Vendors that
write computer programs for the government will have free reign to invoke trade secret and other FOIA exemptions, and thereby prevent access to not only the programs but, as a consequence, to the public
information. 25 This situation would seriously contradict the goals of the
FOIA26 and result in increased public distrust of the government. 2 7
This casenote will analyze the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in
Brown and suggest possible solutions regarding the conflict between vendors' rights and the rights of citizens to unhindered access to public
28
records.
II.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Ralph R. Brown (Brown), in his capacity as a private citizen, made a
request to the Iowa legislative service bureau (bureau) for access to re24. See generally Grodsky, supra note 2 (illustrating that agencies have only recently
begun to examine the issue of whether agency-developed computer programs are public
records and how to apply FOIA mandates to those records.)
25. Five states specifically exempt computer software from disclosure under their public records laws: Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45.221(aX16) (1991); Minnesota - MInN. STAT.
ANN. § 13.03(5) (West 1992); Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.10(B)(3) (1991); Oregon
- OR. REV. STAT. § 268.357(1) (1991); and, Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(A)(24) (Michie
1992).
26. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (declaring that
the congressional objective of the FOIA was to "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and
to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.") See also Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (stating that the thrust of the FOIA is "to permit
access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view"); NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pennzoil Company v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d
627, 630 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that the goal of the FOIA is disclosure.) See also Clement,
supra note 13, at 595.
The basic theory behind the FOIA is that full public disclosure of governmental
information is essential to the survival of democracy since the strength of a democratic government depends directly upon the wisdom of the choices made by its
voters. Furthermore, the task of maintaining an informed electorate has grown
increasingly difficult because of the proliferation of federal administrative agencies that are not directly accountable to the electorate. Id.
27. NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 'The basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed." Id.
28. H.R. Rep. No. 99-560, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1986). "As technology permits an
agency to upgrade its own ability to access, copy, and manipulate data, an agency should
make reasonable attempts to allow public users of agency information to share the benefits
of automation." Id. The U.S. House Committee on Government Operations in 1986 urged
agencies to use modern technology to improve the range and quality of public access to
agency records, not hinder public access. Id.
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districting data.2 9 The data had been prepared by Election Data Serv30
ices (EDS) under contract with the Iowa legislative council (council).
Brown sought to examine and copy the redistricting software and data
bases prepared by EDS as well as any enhancements performed by
EDS.3 ' The council provided for public disclosure of some redistricting
information but denied Brown access to EDS's software and data bases
in machine-readable form.3 2 After making a final, informal request for
the data, Brown brought suit against the council seeking access to the
33
computerized information.
Brown asserted that he was entitled to examine the databases because they were public records,3 4 and as such, they were encompassed by
the Iowa public records law.35 The data to which Brown sought access

consisted of census and election figures that EDS organized for use in the
redistricting process, a service for which the Iowa General Assembly
36
paid EDS with public funds.
EDS intervened in the suit, contending that their programs and the
information, as processed, was a trade secret 3 7 and should be exempt
from disclosure based on the trade secret exemption in Iowa's public
records law.3 8 Although the raw data that EDS utilized was available to
29. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. EDS provided the bureau with the ability to analyze and confirm the appropriateness of its redistricting proposals; the correlation in computer-readable format was

made available to Brown but the original system was not. Id.
33. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553.
34. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980). This case defined public records as
"all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine-readable materials or other documentary
materials, regardless of physical form or characteristic, made or received by an agency of
the United States Government under federal law or in connection with the transaction of
public business." See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.1(3) (West 1991), which defines public
records "[als used in this chapter, 'public records' includes all records, documents, tape or
other information, stored or preserved in any medium, of or belonging to this state or any
county, city, township.. .political subdivision.. .or any branch, department, board, bureau,
commission, council, or committee of any of the foregoing."
35. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2 (West 1991) states '[e]very person shall have the right to

examine and copy public records and to publish or otherwise disseminate public records or
the information contained therein."
36. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 552.
37. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1989) (since amended). At the time of trial, the
statutory definition of trade secret was as follows "information, including but not limited to
a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that is
either of the following: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by a
person able to obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. (b) Is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Id.
38. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7(3) (West 1991). For full text of trade secret exemption, see
supra note 18.
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the public, EDS claimed that the way it manipulated the data was protectable as a trade secret. 39 The process EDS referred to is called "data
base development." 40 Database development entails compiling data in
different forms from different sources (such as the Census Bureau and
Board of Elections), 4 1 purchasing and configuring computer hardware,
and converting the data from all of its sources into uniform, workable
categories. 4 2 The programs prepared by EDS also reflect recent political
43
and legal changes in the field of legislative redistricting.
The trial court determined that the data, as processed, was a trade
secret and refused to order disclosure of the information." On appeal,
the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and refused to
order disclosure of the redistricting information. 4 I
III.

ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS

The threshold issue that the Iowa Supreme Court addressed in
Brown was whether the information that Brown sought to obtain was a
trade secret, and therefore, exempt from disclosure under the Iowa public records law. 46 The court held that the data was a trade secret because EDS exerted reasonable efforts to preserve the secrecy of the
processed information. 4 7 Thus, the court determined that the legislative
council was not required by public records law to allow public access to
48
the information.
39. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553. The court stated "[w]e emphasize that the information
composing the data base itself comes from public sources and is entirely available to plaintiff. It is the process by which the information is correlated that defendant alleges is proprietary and protected from disclosure." Id.
40. Kimball Brace, Doug Chapin & Wayne Arden, Whose Data is it Anyway?: Conflicts
Between Freedom of Information and Trade Secret Protectionin Legislative Redistricting,
21 STETSON L. REV. 723, 726 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Id. The difficulty in correlating census data with election returns is that these
different types of data are linked to units of geography and many of the sources from which
EDS retrieves data attach their figures to different units of geography. Id.
43. Id.
44. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 552.
45. Id.
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7(3) (West 1991). "The following public records shall be kept
confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or
by another person duly authorized to release such information... (3) trade secrets which
are recognized and protected as such by law." Id.
47. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554. The court conferred EDS's information with trade secret status because it satisfied the second element set forth in Iowa Code section 550.2(4),
in the definition of trade secret, "information ... program... or process that... (b) [Ws the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
IOWA CODE § 550.2(4) (1989).
48. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
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The significance of Brown lies in its broader issue and implications.
The true issue goes to how agencies and the courts should distinguish
raw data, clearly obtainable under the FOIA, from computer generated
pools of information and the software which reorganizes that data into
readable form. 4 9 The broader policy issue such a case presents is
whether information submitted to the government by private entities,
and paid for with public funds, should be kept from the public merely
because the private entities wish to keep that information, in its computer-generated form, proprietary.
IV.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning reflected the idea that once a
court determines that information is encompassed by an exemption to
the public records law, the inquiry is at an end; under no circumstances
can that information be released.5 0 This rationale gives no deference to
the goals of public records laws.5 ' The Brown court relied exclusively on
statutory interpretation to reach its decision. 5 2 Specifically, the court interpreted Iowa's public records law, as well as the statutory definition of
trade secret.5 3 The court first set forth an exemption within the Iowa
freedom of information, or public records statute, stating that the custodian of public information is required to deny access to such information
if it is a trade secret recognized and protected by law. 54 The court then
examined the statutory definition of "trade secret" and determined that
EDS's process of arranging redistricting data fell within the definition of
55
a trade secret.
At the time of trial, there were two elements contained within the
statute. The existence of either of these elements would accord information trade secret status: (1) if there is economic value inherent in the
information only as long as it is unknown to others who might gain economic value from it; or (2) if the holder of the alleged trade secret has
49. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 39. Databases have come to resemble "pools" of information rather than discrete documents. Id. For example, relational database systems, developed in the 1970's, allow discrete data items to be linked to constitute a synthesis of
information retrieved from several different files. Id. "In some cases, then, several pieces
of data can or must be connected to make a record . . . A collection of data is called a
"relation" instead of a file." Id. "A record is, in effect, a series of relations rather than a
single file." Id.
50. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 39.
51. For a discussion regarding the equivalent goals of the federal FOIA, see Pennzoil,
534 F.2d at 630.
52. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553-54.
53. Iowa's public records law: IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.1 et seq. (West 1991). Statutory
definition of trade secret: IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1989) (since amended).
54. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553. See IowA CODE ANN. § 22.7(3) (West 1991).
55. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1989).
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made reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.5 6 The court concluded
that the redistricting program was a trade secret because EDS had made
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 57 The court acknowledged,
however, that the statute defining a "trade secret" had been amended
since the trial court rendered its decision requiring, in the future, the
existence of both of the elements set forth above.5 8 This change will
make it significantly more difficult for future litigants to establish the
59
trade secret status of their information.
In determining that EDS's information qualified as a trade secret,
the court examined prior contracts between EDS and other public bodies. 6 0 Specifically, the court examined clauses in those contracts wherein
61
EDS asserted that its services and information were trade secrets.
The court allowed the admission of prior EDS contracts so that EDS
could establish that it had made efforts to preserve the confidentiality of
its services and information.6 2 The mere fact that EDS had declared in
its contracts that its services and information were trade secrets proved
to be a substantial factor in the court's determination that such informa63
tion was indeed a trade secret.
The court also determined that, because parts of EDS's program
56. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1989) (since amended).
57. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
58. Id.
59. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) amended by Acts 1991 (74 G.A.) ch. 35, § 1, eft. April
23, 1991. See 1991 IOWA Legis. Serv. 179 § 2 (West), which states "[tlhe 1991 amendment,. . . defining 'trade secret,' substituted 'both' for 'either'." The Act also sets forth
"[tihis Act, being deemed of immediate importance, takes effect upon enactment." Id. The
Brown court only reached the conclusion that EDS's information satisfied one of the elements. Brown at 554. The court did not require EDS to show any threat of economic or
competitive harm in order to establish trade secret status. Id. If the statute had required
proof of both elements, that would have seriously weakened EDS's case.
60. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553.
61. Id at 554. The following is an excerpt from a typical EDS contract:
TRADE SECRETS: It is expressly understood by the parties of this Agreement
that the services and information provided by EDS, Inc. under this Agreement are
considered a "trade secret", because the services and information are considered
proprietary and disclosure of such services and information may cause competitive
harm to EDS, Inc.
62. Id. Brown raised the objection that admission of EDS' prior contracts was hearsay.
Id. Brown claimed that the clauses in the contracts were being used to prove that EDS'
data bases were trade secrets and that EDS was acting to preserve their secrecy. Id. The
court held that the contracts were admissible, not to prove that the data bases were trade
secrets, but as verbal acts offered to show that the statements were made in EDS contracts.
Id. The court held that the contracts were admissible because, as verbal acts, they had
independent legal significance. Id.; see 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1770 (Chadbourn rev.
1976); J. Weinstein and M. Berger, EVIDENCE, 801(c)[01] (1991).
63. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554 (determining that "the [contract] clauses serve to establish the fact of reasonable efforts to preserve secrecy.")
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were encrypted, 6 4 or coded, EDS impliedly expected confidential treatment of its information.6 5 Based on these two factors, the court concluded that EDS had made reasonable efforts to protect the secrecy of its
66
information and held that the databases were trade secrets.
In dicta, the court finally addressed the most troublesome and significant issue of the case. "IT]his case is troubling because the rights of
the vendor to its trade secret come into conflict with the rights of citizens
to information purchased for the government at public expense. The conflict is heightened because voting, a fundamental right, underlies the dispute." 6 7 The court went on to say that the trial court did have the option
to propose an alternative remedy that would have allowed a citizen to
examine the materials while protecting the trade secret, but that it did
68
not elect to do so.
The court also stated that the trial court could have ordered disclosure of the information notwithstanding its trade secret status. 69 However, the court concluded that Brown, by not suggesting an alternative
form of disclosure, did not raise the issue on appeal in a manner that
would require the Iowa Supreme Court to entertain such alternative
70
remedies.

64. Encrypted from the word "cryptic" meaning hidden, concealed, or secret. THE
319 (1981). Cryptography is a
mathematical science of "secret writing" used to ensure communications are only understandable to the intended recipient. Id. Cryptoanalysis is the mathematical science of deciphering or "breaking" the code of the enciphered information. See Handelman, Special
Report: CryptographicResearch and the National Security, SIAM NEWS, June, 1981, at 1,
col. 3.
65. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554. The court stated that "[t]here is other evidence [of
efforts to preserve secrecy]. The source codes are encrypted." Id.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court conceded that "[tihe trial court is not helpless, in an appropriate
case, to fashion a tentative remedy, one that would allow an exploration of the materials
while protecting the trade secret." Id.
69. Id. The court explained that "[i]f the data bases are found to be exempt from disclosure under IOWA CODE section 22.7 they must be kept confidential 'unless otherwise
ordered by a court'. Under this provision, even if the data bases are exempt from disclosure
under section 22.7, a court could order their disclosure notwithstanding the exemption."
Id.; see also Clement, supra note 13, at 597. "Nothing in the language of the FOIA directly
supports the proposition that the exemptions mandate agency withholding of exempt information. The Act simply states that it 'does not apply to matters that are' exempt. Congress
could have made the exemptions mandatory.. .the wording of the FOIA, however, contains
no hint that Congress intended to enact a restrictive statute." Id.
70. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
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V. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS
The court's decision in Brown is disquieting because it prohibits access to information, which should be available to the public, under the
theory of trade secret protection. The court's decision in Brown was inappropriate for several reasons. First, the court did not delineate exactly
what it was labeling as a trade secret. The court avoided drawing distinctions between the raw data, the data as it was organized by EDS's
program, and the software which made that information accessible. The
court merely accepted EDS's assertion that the information and software
were part of a package "trade secret", the benefits of which the company
provided to government bodies.
In accepting EDS's assertions, the court not only failed to separate
the different characteristics of the information and deal with them accordingly, it also granted the entire package of information overly broad
trade secret protection, thereby contradicting the goal of the public
records law. In addition, the court's decision contradicted a provision
within Iowa's public records law that prohibits government bodies from
hiring independent contractors to perform activities which government
71
bodies could not legally perform themselves.
Finally, the court's decision was inadequate because the court could
have provided several alternative remedies which would have satisfied
the goals of the public records law without causing competitive harm to
EDS. 72 For these reasons, the Iowa Supreme Court should have ordered

disclosure of the redistricting information requested by Brown.
A.

ANALYZING REQUESTS FOR COMPUTERIZED GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

It is becoming increasingly clear that the FOIA, as originally
drafted, is not well suited to treat the vast body of computerized government records. 7 3 Nevertheless, courts have still been able to analogize
many aspects of requests for computerized records to requests for paper
information and apply the FOIA successfully.7 4 At issue in Brown was
71. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.2(5)(b) (West 1991). For full text of the provision see infra
note 121.
72. See note 123, infra for examples of computerized public access systems which pro-

vide access to information while compensating the private companies that developed the
systems.
73. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 26.
74. Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admn., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Although it is clear that Congress was aware of problems that could arise in
the application of the FOIA to computer-stored records, the Act itself makes no
distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems... it is thus clear that computer-stored records, whether stored in the central
processing unit, or magnetic tape or in some other form, are still 'records' for the
purposes of the FOIA. Although accessing information from computers may in-
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not necessarily whether the legislative council would release the information Brown requested, but rather, how that information would be organized and in what medium Brown would receive it. Based on the few
cases courts have decided on this issue, it appears that thus far,
although an agency finds that a FOIA request for computerized information is reasonable, the agency is not legally bound to offer the information in any specified format. 75 This is troublesome because a requester's
ability to analyze large quantities of raw data may be dependent on the
specific program or software used by the agency. 76 Since courts may
have little technical knowledge about how computerized information is
processed, and cannot determine exactly what types of computer operations are necessary to retrieve and effectively use an agency's data, it will
be diiicult to determine in future cases whether requester's rights under
the FOIA are being arbitrarily denied based on convincing, yet faulty,
77
arguments against trade secret revelation.
B.

THE GOAL OF PUBLIC RECORDS LAW

The court's decision in Brown was inappropriate because it accorded
EDS overly broad trade secret protection, thereby contradicting the goals
of the public records law. The federal Freedom of Information Act, which
nearly every state has adopted with slight modifications, compels the release, on request, of all agency records not covered by one of nine exemptions. 78 These nine exemptions have been the source of most freedom of
volve a somewhat different process than locating and retrieving manually-stored
records, these differences may not be used to circumvent the full disclosure policies
of the FOIA.
75. See Grodsky, supra note 2, at 32.
76. Id. at 34.
77. Id. at 36.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(bXl)-(9) (1988). The following are the nine FOIA exemptions:
This section does not apply to matters that are - (IXA) specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant
to such Executive order; (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters
be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matter to be withheld; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to dis-
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A majority of commentators have observed that, rather than providing courts with objective guidelines, the statutory language of freedom of
information acts is highly ambiguous.8 0 Thus, courts have virtually disregarded the "plain meaning" of the exemptions and have typically chosen to rule in favor of full disclosure.8 1 Consequently, the predominant
82
practice is for courts to narrowly construe all exemptions.
In contrast to the majority of courts, the court in Brown broadly construed the trade secret exemption, thereby shielding public information
from disclosure. The court afforded EDS with overly broad trade secret
protection by viewing the trade secret exemption as an absolute bar to
disclosure of such information, thereby contradicting the goals of public
records laws.8 3
In Environmental ProtectionAgency v. Mink,8 4 the U.S. Supreme
Court advanced the rule that courts should read the exemptions to the
FOIA not as absolute barriers to disclosure, but as categories of information over which agencies and courts may have discretion regarding requests for disclosure.8 5 The court held that the exemption portion of the
FOIA "represents the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidenclose the identity of a confidential source... and, in the case of a record compiled
by a law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel; (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible
for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps concerning wells.
79. John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental Contradiction, 34
AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1160 (1985).
80. See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736, 745
(D.Md. 1978). "Statutory prohibition against disclosure of trade secret.. .unless otherwise
authorized by law is too broad in scope to qualify as exemption statute within the FOIA
providing that statutory disclosure requirements do not apply to matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." See also Victor H. Kramer & David B. Weinberg, The
Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49, 52 (1974) (describing the act as hardly "the
apogee of legislative draftsmanship"); Moon, supra note 79.
81. See, e.g., Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599-603
(1982); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280,
1288-90 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
82. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1975); EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
84. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
85. Id. at 80.
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tial, if it so chooses."8 6 Nevertheless, the Court reiterated the point that
the fullest possible disclosure is the goal of the FOIA and its exemptions.8 7 Courts throughout the country recognize the policy that "FOIA
exemptions provide categories of information which the government is
not required to disclose, but the Act does not in its terms bar voluntary
disclosure by the government of information in those categories."8 8
In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,8 9 the U.S. Supreme Court
again addressed the issue of whether, assuming that the requested information fell within a FOIA exemption, the exemption was a complete bar
to disclosure. In Rose, law review editors sought access to case summaries of honor and ethics hearings at an Air Force academy. 90 The Air
Force argued that because such information fell within an exemption to
the FOIA relating to internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,
it was therefore exempt from disclosure. 9 1 The Court held that even if
such information fell within the exemption, such an exemption from disclosure cannot be invoked when the "matters addressed are of genuine
and significant public interest as the substantial and public role of the
92
Air Force and its academy."
The Court stated that, given the public interest in disclosure of such
documents, the Air Force could not withhold them on the basis of the
exemption because "nothing in the wording of [the exemption] or its legislative history [would] support the Agency's claim that Congress created
a blanket exemption for personnel files."9 3 The Court held that the exemptions are limited 94 and that the statutory goal of the exemptions
86. Id. The Court then quoted from Senate committee hearings on the exemptions "[iut
was not 'an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one
either.. .[s]uccess lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest possible disclosure.'" Id. See also
S.Rep.No. 93-854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (Congress did not intend the exemptions in
the FOLA to be used either to prohibit disclosure of information or to justify automatic
withholding of information. Rather, they are only permissive. They merely mark the outer
limits of information that may be withheld where the agency makes a specific affirmative
determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate - as
well as that the intent of the exemption relied on allows - that the information should be
withheld).
87. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 80.
88. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Pennzoil, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. General Services Admn., 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C., 1974).
89. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
90. Id.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX2) provides "[this section does not apply to matters that are...
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."
92. Rose, 425 U.S. at 367.
93. Id. at 371.
94. Id. at 353 (emphasizing that "[tihe limited statutory exemptions do not obscure the
basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the FOIA.")
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under the FOIA was to reach a compromise between individual rights
95
and the preservation of public rights to government information.
Although the Court in Rose discussed a different exemption than the
one at issue in Brown, the rule set forth by the Court is one that courts
can apply when construing any of the exemptions. 9 6 The Court stated
that, by providing specific statutory exemptions from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA (or equivalent state public records laws), Congress
vested in courts the duty to determine de novo any question as to
whether an exemption has been properly invoked and whether the public
97
information requested will be withheld by virtue of the exemption.
The court in Brown should have applied the balancing test set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rose. The Brown court noted that it was
aware of the significance of the competing interests in the case, but erred
when it did not employ a balancing test of those interests as the Court
did in Rose. 98 Public interest in the redistricting process, a process
which directly affects election results, is arguably much stronger than
public interest in honor and ethics hearings at an Air Force academy.
Given the substantial interest that the public has in the voting and redistricting processes, if the court had employed the Rose balancing test,
,the public interest would surely have outweighed the interests of EDS.
Thus, use of the Rose test would have necessitated a ruling in favor of
disclosure of the requested information.
In Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,99 the U.S. Court of
Appeals stated that, in attempting to establish trade secret protection for
government records, "a bare claim of confidentiality [will not] immunize
agency files from scrutiny."10 0 In Brown, however, the court did "immunize files. . .from scrutiny" primarily based on EDS's "bare claim of
confidentiality." 0 1
The Brown court held that EDS had established the trade secret status of its information because it had made reasonable efforts to preserve
its secrecy.' 0 2 However, the efforts the court referred to were essentially
no more than bare claims of confidentiality. The court relied heavily on a
95. Id. at 373.
96. Id at 353 (indicating that "[wlith respect to such files and 'similar files' Congress
enunciated a policy, to be judicially enforced, involving a balancing of public and private
interests.")
97. Id. at 379.
98. Id.
99. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
100. Id. at 938.
101. Id. Brown 490 N.W.2d at 554.
102. Bristol-Myers Co. 424 F.2d at 938. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) (West 1989),
which requires one of two elements in the definition of trade secret, the second being information that "[isthe subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
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clause appearing in EDS contracts 0 3 when it decided that EDS had
tried to maintain the secrecy of its programs and information. 10 4 The
clause was merely statement made by EDS declaring that "the services
and information provided by EDS, Inc.... are considered a 'trade secret,'
because the services and information are considered proprietary....
The circular wording of this clause does not amount to anything more
than a bare claim of confidentiality, and the court was wrong to afford it
substantial weight. The Bristol-Meyers court further explained that the
purpose of the FOIA trade secret exemption is to protect the competitive
positions of private parties who provide government policy makers with
information.' 0 6 Although EDS was not required by statute to establish
any threat of competitive harm,' 0 7 its contract clauses indicated that
protection of its competitive position was the reason it required trade
secret protection.' 0 8 Significantly, however, the court's opinion never indicated how permitting Brown access to the data would cause EDS any
competitive harm.
The burden of proof in a dispute over disclosure of public information is upon the party seeking to invoke an exemption from mandatory
disclosure. 10 9 In U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer
Advocate, 110 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled on the degree of proof of economic harm that is necessary to warrant the operation of a trade secret
103. See supra note 61 for full text of EDS clause.
104. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554.
105. Id.
106. Bristol-Myers Co. at 938. See also IowA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4)(a) (West 1989) (since
amended) (listing as the first element of a trade secret the existence of a threat to the
competitive position of the party asserting trade secret status.)
107. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(4) was amended in 1991 to require the existence of both
elements set forth in the statutory definition of trade secret. (74 G.A.) ch. 35, § 1, eff. April
23, 1991. Pursuant to IowA CODE § 3.7, the court applied the statute as it existed at the
time the trial court rendered its decision. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554. If the Iowa Supreme
Court had applied the statute as it existed when it rendered its decision, and as it continues to exist, EDS's information may not have qualified as a trade secret because EDS did
not prove a threat of competitive harm. Id. For a discussion of the application of amended
statutes see Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840 (Scalia, A.
concurring) (1990) (discussing the existing conflict regarding retroactivity of laws created
by previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions). See also Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416
U.S. 696 (1974) (holding that "an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision."); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (holding that if the law changes between the decision of a lower court and the decision of the
appellate court, the appellate court must apply the law as it exists when it renders its
decision.)
108. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 554. EDS's contracts state that EDS's services and information are a trade secret because "disclosure of such services and information may cause competitive harm to EDS, Inc." Id. (citing a typical EDS contract clause.)
109. Cochran v. U.S., 770 F.2d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. 498 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1993).
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exemption.1 1 1 The court determined that employee affidavits concerning
the negative effects disclosure would have on the company invoking
trade secret protection were "self-serving and did not contain hard facts"
concerning the extent of competitive harm that would result from disclosure of the requested information. 112 Accordingly, the court held that
since disclosure would serve a public purpose, and there was little evidence of a significant countervailing interest, the information was not
1 i3
exempt under Iowa's public records law.
In Brown, although EDS asserted its interest in protecting its competitive position, the only evidence EDS offered in this regard was the
language of its own contracts, discussed above. The court acknowledged
that Brown was acting in his capacity as a citizen who had been involved
in the redistricting process since 1963.114 EDS never contended that it
considered Brown a competitor nor someone who would gain economic
value from the information he sought. 1 15 Because EDS did not present
evidence of actual or potential competitive harm, it did not meet its burden of proof in invoking the trade secret protection exemption.
C.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CouRT's DECISION AND A PROVISION
IN THE IOWA CODE

The court's decision was improper because it allowed the legislative
council to prevent examination of a public record by contracting with a
111. Id. at 714.
112. Id. at 715 (noting that "[w]hile reference is made to competitors, the record is
vague concerning the extent of the advantage the.. .information will provide competitors.")
113. Id. at 715.
114. Brown, 490 N.W.2d at 553. The court acknowledged that Brown's interest in the
information was purely inquisitive; he wanted the information so that he could participate
in the upcoming public hearings regarding the redistricting proposals. Id.
115. EDS was probably not concerned with Brown accessing the information in order to
participate in the public hearings. EDS most likely feared that Brown or a third party
would employ a process known as "reverse engineering." See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Reverse engineering involves starting with a known product and working backwards to uncover the process which aided in its development. Id. The
Court in Kewanee held that the protection accorded a trade secret holder is against disclosure or unauthorized use by those to whom the secret has been confided under express
restriction of nondisclosure or by one who has gained knowledge by "improper means," but
that trade secret status does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest
means, such as reverse engineering. Id. Reverse engineering is a legitimate means of discovering trade secrets. Id. In essence, therefore, EDS was attempting to prevent citizens
from gaining access to information even though they would be acquiring the information
through "fair and honest means." Id. See also Basic Chemicals, Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d
220, 226 (Iowa 1977). The elements of a claim based on misappropriation of a trade secret
are: "(1) existence of a trade secret; (2) acquisition of the secret as a result of a confidential
relationship; and, (3) unauthorized use of the secret." Id. The court also held that the
plaintiff in a suit alleging misappropriation has the burden of proving each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
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nongovernment body to perform one of its duties. Iowa Code section
22.2(2) mandates that "[a] government body shall not prevent the examination or copying of a public record by contracting with a nongovernment
body to perform any of its duties or functions." 1 16 Redistricting is a legislative function 1 7 which was contracted out by Iowa's legislature to a private corporation. The law does not prohibit the legislature from hiring a
private company to process redistricting information. However, by invoking trade secret protection, EDS and the legislative council prevented
the examination of those public records generated by EDS. 1 8
Furthermore, although the legislature could not use any political criteria in drafting its redistricting plan, 1 19 EDS agreed to generate a political data base, based on prior election returns, which allowed the
legislature to analyze the political ramifications of alternative redistricting plans. 120 Iowa Code section 42.4(5)(b) forbids this practice and is
arguably a primary reason why the legislature did not want EDS's data
to be accessible to the public. 12 1 The court acknowledged this statute but
made no comment on the impropriety of the legislature in contracting
12 2
with EDS to compile a database containing this political criteria.
Thus, the legislature was allowed to analyze the political effects various
district proposals would have and the court allowed the legislative council to hide this practice from the public by disregarding the statute which
expressly forbids such action.
116. IowA CODE ANN. § 22.2(2) (West 1991).
117. IOWA CONST., art. III, § 35.
118. Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub.L.No. 100-235, 101 § 1724 (1988). The Computer Security
Act of 1987 prohibits agencies from withholding computerized records from the public if the
records would be available to the public under the FOIA as paper documents. See also
Long v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1979) (advocating a rule

similar to that created by the Computer Security Act.) "In view of the common, widespread
use of computers by government agencies for information storage and processing, any interpretation of the FOIA which limits its application to conventional written documents
contradicts the 'general philosophy of full agency disclosure' which Congress intended to
establish." Id.
119. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(1) (West 1991). Legislative and congressional districts are
to be established on the basis of population. Id. The Code goes to great lengths with respect
to creating geographical and population divisions, but says nothing permitting districting
according to political effect. Id. EDS's program performs analytical functions by manipulating three basic forms of data: geographical, population and political. Brown, 490 N.W.2d
at 553.
120. Brown, at 553.
121. "No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent
legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial minority group. In establishing districts, no use shall be made of any of the following data: . . . b.) political
affiliations of registered voters.' IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.2(5Xb) (West 1991).
122. Id.
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The Brown court's decision allowed the legislative council to deny
access to public records and to perform a prohibited redistricting practice, all by virtue of the fact that the council contracted with a
nongovernment body to perform one of its duties with the aid of computers. This is a trend which must not be followed.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Computers are extremely powerful and versatile information
sources. The government and the public should exploit the capabilities
of computer programs to the fullest, thereby creating a better informed,
more active populace. 12 3 However, courts must begin to formulate more
effective resolutions of the new issues created by the sophistication of
computer technology.
With the prevalent use of computers in all areas of government operations, 124 vast amounts of information are processed using secret mathematical configurations written by private entities. If cases like Brown
are interpreted broadly, it could mean that any information processed in
this manner automatically becomes protected as a trade secret. If categorized as a trade secret, the information can be deemed an exception to
freedom of information acts and the public will be denied access. This is
an unacceptable result.
The decision in Brown serves to perpetuate overly broad protections
afforded to private vendors that supply the government with information. Most, if not all, public records will inevitably be totally computerized. Once this is the case, will all of this public information be
considered trade secret simply because private entities write the programs which organize that data?
There are several ways to avoid this result, but this will require progressive, innovative programs and laws which the government and the
123. Bunker, supra note 14, at 562 (discussing a possible solution to the issue of public
access to government software.) "The first large federal electronic information system
designed for public access was the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) $35 million
Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval System (EDGAR)." Id. A private vendor operates
EDGAR for the SEC. "Because the information is public, neither the SEC nor the contractor is allowed to exert any form of copyright or ownership over the data kept in EDGAR.
The contractor generates revenue by charging a fee to users who access EDGAR to examine
or retrieve public documents or information." Id. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency has devised an innovative public, computerized access system. Id. The Agency
maintains a data base consisting of a list of companies that emit one or more of three
hundred and fifty toxic pollutants. Id. This information is available through an electronic
data base, the Toxic Release Inventory. Id. This inventory is available, for an hourly fee, to
anyone with a microcomputer and a telephone modem. Id. at 563.
124. Id.
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judiciary must initiate and promote. 12 5 First, federal, state, and local
governments must consider the goals of open government and freedom of
information when they develop and implement new computerized information systems. Although this may result in additional steps that the
agencies would not have to take if not for the FOIA, this initial effort will
prove to be minimal compared to the effort and resources necessary to
defend the agencies in potentially frequent litigation regarding denied
requests for information.
Second, government agencies and courts must learn to differentiate
formats and components of computerized information. Decivarious
the
sions and policies must clearly indicate whether computer programs
themselves and the pools of information they create -distinct from the
raw information stored and processed by the computers- are considered
public records.
Third, government agencies could successfully implement programs
that would allow complete disclosure of government records, while protecting the interests of private vendors. One alternative is for agencies
to establish services whereby citizens can access information using computer software, but require payment of hourly fees in order to subsidize
the development and maintenance of sophisticated computer systems.
Another option is that agency information be available to the public via
"network servers." These are computers that store "shared" information,
which is accessible to individuals by the use of personal computers. Network servers allow individuals access to much larger databases and
much more powerful processing capacity than that to which they would
have access using their personal computers alone, or by physically visiting each agency from which they were requesting information.
A final option is for Congress to amend, or supplement the FOIA to
specifically address access to electronic information. Such an addition to
the Act would outline guidelines and procedures for agencies to follow
when presented with requests for computerized information. The Act
would define broadly what types of searches would be deemed "reasonable" under the FOIA and would provide for modifications of the reasonableness standard as technology advances.
125. See Bunker, supra note 16, at 563, 564 (reciting seven factors that are significant
obstacles to the development of efficient systems of public access to computerized government records.) "(1) State laws that do not place a priority on access; (2) vulnerability of
systems to security breaches from either loss of electronic data as a result of technological
problems or unauthorized access to the data; (3) threats to the confidentiality of some information kept on computer; (4) cost of hardware and software needed to provide access; (5)
ability of available software to provide requested information; (6) lack of citizen awareness
and interest; and, (7) varied technology making it difficult to standardize computer systems
and access programs." Id.
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The federal government must set a uniform standard for agencies
and courts to apply when evaluating requests for electronic information.
As exemplified by the decision in Brown v. Iowa Legislative Council, a
piecemeal approach to interpreting the application of public records laws
to electronic information will be adverse to the goals of the FOIA and will
result in inconsistent results across the country. Only government action will prevent unpredictable results, and give industry and agencies
the consistency necessary to participate in the market.
Elizabeth M. Dillon

